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ln the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

ALFRED J. FOWERS,
)
Plaintiff and Appellant. ,
vs.

\

DONAill GURNEY and !RETA F. )
GURNEY, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

CASE

NO. 11,278

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The case is one of foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, but the legal question on appeal involves bankruptcy
and the entitlement of the plaintiff below to a deficiency
judgment against Donald Gurney, one of the defendants.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At the time of the pre-trial, plaintiff orally moved the
court for summary judgment for a decree of foreclosure,
and defendants orally moved the court for summary judgment upon the i~ue of plaintiff's entitlement to a deficiency
judgment in the event the property did not sell for enough
to pay the amount of plaintiff's note and mortgage (R. 77).
It was stipulated by counsel that plaintiff was not entitled

to a deficiency judgment against defendant, Ireta F. Gurney, and that the obligation sought to be foreclosed by
p:aintiff was properly scheduled by defendant, Donald Gurney, in his bankruptcy schedules of his Petition in Bankruptcy filed on March 7, 1967 (R. 76). Plaintiff's con·
tention that he is entitled to a deficiency judgment against
defendant. Donald Gurney, is based upon his claim that
somehow the obligation which he is attempting to foreclose
dated July 2, 1965, arose after the filing of Gurney's petition in bankruptcy on l\1arch 7, 1967 (R. 76). The trial
court ultimately ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to a
deficiency judgment against defendant, Donald Gurney, for
the J'ea$OIJ1 that the obligation arose sometime before his
filing of his petition in bankruptcy (R. 78). Plaintiff then
filed affidavits as to the amounts owing on the obligation,
and caused to be signed and filed in the lower cowt Find·
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a iDecree of Foreclosure wherein the property was ordered sold and the proceeds paid to the plaintiff, but specifically provided that no
deficiency judgment should be awarded against the defend·
ants (R. 79-81). No further steps have been taken by
plaintiff to have the prope rty so~d pursuant to the foreclosure decree, he having elected to file an appeal to the
Supreme Court from the lower court's adverse ruling on
his contention that he is entitled to a deficiency judgment
on his Amended Complaint, should there be a deficiency.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents believe the ruling of the trial court with
respect to plaintiff's non-entitlement to a deficiency judg·
ment as against defendant, Donald Gurney, is correct, and
seeks only an affirmation of that ruling in this Court
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as set forth by appellant are
not necessarily incorrect but in defendants' view they are
somewhat misleading, and are incomplete to properly presrnt the legal issues to the Court.
The Court's attention is specifically directed to the
facts as found by the trial court on October 24, 1967 (R.
55-56). No appeal was then or is now made from those
findings, and it is clear therefrom that it was highly improper for the plaintiff to have entered the original deficiency judgment on March 10, 1966, inasmuch as the parties had a complete meeting of the minds and ·an agreement several days before that time. to-wit, the latter part
of February, 1966, for the reinstatement of ithe 1965 note
and mortgage. Thereafter, as both parties agree, and as
the lower court found, def.endant, Gurney, made payments
to the plaintiff in the exact amount of the monthly payments called for by the original note for more than eight
months, (R. 56 and R. 34-36) , all of which were accepted
by tihe plaintiff and credited on the original 1965 note and
mortgage, (R. 37 and 59). It was more than thirteen
months after the agreement to reinstate, during all of which
r"eriod the conduct of the parties was consistent with reinstatement and inconsistent with anything else, when defendant Gurney's p~tition in bankruptcy was filed. This
w~ on March 7, 1967.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TIIE OBLIGATION BEING SUED UPON IN THIS
\CTION AROSE IN THE LATTER PART OF FEBRU-
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ARY, 1%6, OR PRIOR THERETO, PURSUANT TO A};
AGREEl'v1ENT OF THE PARTIES, AND NO'I' BY ACT
OF THE COURT ON OCTOBER 24. 1967.
If Point I of plaintiff's argument is understood cor·
i-ectly, he is contending tha.Jt the indebtedness which is being sued upon in this action arose on October 24, 1967, be-

cause that was the date when the court made its decision
that the 1965 note and mortgage had b2en reinstated, and,
therefore, coming after the petition in bankruptcy. which
was filed on l\farch 7, 1967, it is a new obligation not
affected by the prior bankruptcy.
I:t is hard to believe that plaintiff is serious in this contention for it is elementary that the court cannot, does not,
and will not make a contract for the parties which they do
not make for themselves. 17 Am. Jur. 2nd 413. The trial
court has specifically found in the case at bar and the
same is nm disputed on this appeal, that the parti€\S, themselves, reinstated the note and mortgage sued upon herein
by an agreement which they made in the latter part of
February, 1966, and that the agreement which they made
was fully performed by boith sides by August 23, 1966, at
the latest (R. 78 and 55-57). Either date is well before the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, which occurred on
March 7. 1967.
Plaintiff has cited no case or other authority holding
to the contrary. The quotations from CJS set forth in
plaintiff's brief may be good law, but the principles cited
therein are not applicable in this case.
POINT II
THERE HAS BEEN NO PROMISE TO P .AJ.Y TIIE
INDEBTEDNESS SINCE THE ADJUDICATION OF
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BANKRUPTCY ON THE PEITl'ION FILED BY THE
DEFENDANT, DONALD GURNEY, ON MARCH 7, 1967.

In his Point II, plaintiff seems to state in effect that
because of defendants' motion being filed on March 20,
1967, which was some 13 days after the petition for bankrup~cy was filed, the making of such motion constituted
an "acknowledgement" of the debt by defendant, Gurney,
and that somehow an acknowledgement of the debt revived
the same after bankruptcy and then created a legally enforceable obligation unaffected by the bankruptcy.
On the general question as to when a discharged debt
is revived, the rule has been set forth by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Allen v. Feriguson, 18 iWall, 1, 3, 2
L. ed. 854, wherein the court said:

"All the authorities agree in this, that the promise made
by which a discharged debt is revived must be clear.
distinct, and unequivocal. It may be an absolute or a
conditional promise, but in either case it must be unequivocal."
In 10 Am. Jur. 2d at page 619, the editors state as follows:

"To be effective as a revival of a discharged debt, the
pro:mise must be either express or directly implied: ht
the terms used; it cannot be implied simply from conduct recognizing the d.eibt, - for example, from a payment on account of either principal or interest. A
simple acknowledgement of the justness of the debt
and of its present existence as a debt formerly ieontracted and now unpaid, or the expression of a hope,
desire, expectation, or intention to pay, is not sufficient to revive a discharged debt." (Emphasis supplied.
Se-e also 75 ALR 580, wherein begins a comprehensive
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annotation relating to the question as to the revival
of a debt by a bankrupt's subsequent promise to pay.)
H is further the general rule that the unequivocal pro-

mise must be made by the debtor direc:t to the creditor or
his attorney or agent (9 Am. Jur. 2d 620).
We invite the Court to examine the language of the
motion and supplement tlle·reto which appear on pages 31·
33 of the Record, and we are confident that it must con·
elude that no clear, distinct, and unequivocal promise on the
part orf the defendant to pay the obligation can be read
therein.
In the California case of Brink vs. Brink, 299 Pac. 2d
991, involving a fact situation similar to the case at bar,
but factually more fa vora:ble to the plaintiff on the same
issue raised herein by the defendants, the court held that
an application for final divorce based upon a property set·
tlement agreement containing a promise to pay $1800.00
enteir·~d into prior to bankruptcy did not revive the obliga·
tion to pay the $1800.00. In that case the discharge in
bankruptcy of the obligation to pay $1800.00 occurred after
the interloc:utory decree and before the application was
made for final decree based upon the prcrp.zrty settlement
containing the promise to pay $1800.00. Holding that the
application for final decree was not a "prom.is~" to pay the
discharged obligation, the court said:
"When a debt has been discharged by proceedings in
insolvency, or has become barre::i by the statute of
limitations, the remedy to enforce the payment of the
debt is gone, but the moral obligation to pay it still remains, and is good consideration for a new promis'
to make such payment. (Citing case,;) And it is wr!l
settled that when an action is brought to recover up-0n
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a new promise and to support the acti.o.- it must appear that the promise was clear, distinct.. unconditional,
and unequivocal. (Citing more cases.)
"When plaintiff sought and obtained the fina1 decree
he applied for and obtained neither more nor less than
he had the right and pawer to apply for and obtain.
We cannot spell out of that a promise to pay the discharged obligation." (Emphasis supplied.)
We contend, ·in the same fashion, that when the motion was made to set aside the deficiency judgment entered
:mrreptitiously and improperly on March 10, 1966, defendants applied for and sought no more nor less than they bad
the right and power to apply for and obtain, and that no
dear, distinct, and unequivocal promise to pay the schedul.€d obligation can be reasonably spelled out from the fa.ct
ot making the motion or the language used therein, or in
the lower court's rulings thereon.
If by some tortuous method, the motion of defendants
might be construed as a "promise" to pay, then defendants
would have to and did take the position in the lower court
that any "promise" to pay would have to be made by him
or his authorized agent, and that.his counsel, who prepared,
signed, and filed the motion, had absolutely no authority

to promise to pay thz plaintiff anything. It would be more
than ludicrous if any presumption is indulged in that deft:ndants' counsel was given the authority to promise

pay the very obligation about which he was employed
defend against.

to

to

CONCLUSION

We respectfully conclude that the contentions of the
plaintiff in his Points I and II are entirely without merit;

that the court on October 24, 1967. by its decision did nu!
and could not create any obligation which the parties them.
selves did not create at som2 prlor time, which in this case
was the latter part of February, 1966, or at the very latest,
August 23, 19S6, either date well b2fore the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy; that the filing of the motion to declare the original deficiency judgment satisfied, filed by
defendants' counsel on March 20, 1967, under no legal au·
thority can be construed as a "promise" to pay the sched·
uled obligation sought to be foreclosed herein; and finally,
it would be absurd to believe, as plaintiff contends, that
defendants' counsel had any authority whatever to bind
the defendants to pay the very obligation which he was
employed to defend against.
We conclude, that the trial court committed no revers·
ible error, and that its decision rendered herein should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ALDRICH. BULLOCK & NELSON
Attorneys for Respondents
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah
By: J. Robert Bullock

